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Detecting Misappropriation Schemes

Author/Moderator: Joseph Wells, CFE, CPA
Publisher: AICPA
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Description

Train to focus analytical and substantive tests on the flow of cash through the company, utilizing financial and nonfinancial information. You'll learn to identify critical signs of misappropriation of assets and analyze fraud schemes. Course highlights include a framework for detecting misappropriation schemes and fraud schemes in such areas as cash, inventory, fixed assets and payroll disbursements.

Objectives: 

  • Identify critical signs of misappropriation of assets
  • Develop policies and procedures to prevent fraud

Prerequisite:  Experience in working on fraud examination engagements.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter 1 - The Pervasive Threat of Employee Theft
    • Learning Objectives
    • Introduction
    • 2004 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse
      • Types of Organizations
      • Measuring the Cost of Occupational Fraud
      • How Occupational Fraud Is Committed
      • Detecting Occupational Fraud
      • Limiting Fraud Losses
      • The Perpetrators
      • Case Results
  • Chapter 2 - Cash Theft Schemes - Part I: Skimming
    • Learning Objectives
    • Introduction
    • Fraudulent Disbursement
    • Cash Theft Scheme
    • Skimming v. Larceny
    • Skimming
      • Sales Skimming
      • Unrecorded Sales
      • Suggestions for Detecting and Preventing Understated Sales Schemes
      • On-Site Employees - Unattended
      • On-Site Employees - Attended
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting the Physical Misappropriation of Unrecorded Sales
      • Detecting Lapping of Sales or Receivables
      • Remote Salespersons
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Skimming by Remote Salespersons
      • Sales Made during Non-business Hours
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Unauthorized Business Operations during Non-Business Hours
    • Skimming Receivables
      • Failure to Itemize Receipts
      • Forcing Account Balances or Destroying Transaction Records
      • Writing off Account Balances or Debiting Fictitious Accounts
      • Inappropriately Debiting Accounts
      • Debiting Fictitious Accounts
      • Suggestions for Preventing or Detecting Receivables Skimming That Is Concealed by Forcing Totals, Inappropriately Writing off Balances, or Debiting Fictitious Accounts
      • Theft in the Mail Room - Incoming Checks
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting the Theft of Checks from the Mailroom
      • Lapping
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Lapping
      • Stolen Statements
      • Suggestions for Preventing or Detecting Employees Who Attempt to Conceal Skimming by Producing Counterfeit Customer Statements
  • Chapter 2 - Cash Theft Schemes - Part II: Larceny of Revenues
    • Learning Objectives
    • Introduction
    • Larceny of Revenues
      • Unconcealed Larceny of Revenues
      • Destroying or Altering Records of Stolen Receipts
      • Fabricating Sales Records
      • Thefts from Other Registers
      • "Death by a Thousand Cuts"
      • Altering Cash Counts
      • Cash Larceny from the Deposit
      • Absence of Controls S One Person in Charge of the Deposit
      • Targeting Currency
      • Failure to Reconcile Deposits
      • Altering the Receipted Deposit Slip
      • Suggestions for Preventing or Detecting Larceny from the Deposit
      • Deposits in Transit
      • Deposit Lapping
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Larceny from the Deposit That Is Concealed by Lapping or as Deposits in Transit
      • Lack of Common Sense
      • Converting Stolen Checks
    • Preventing and Detecting Cash Theft
      • Separation of Duties in the Receipt of Cash
      • Handling Over-the-Counter Receipts
      • Handling Cash Received through the Mail
      • Handling the Deposit
      • Red Flags S Cash Theft Schemes
      • General Control Objectives
      • Maintaining Physical Security of Cash
      • Analytical Review
      • Cash Account Analysis
      • Surprise Cash Counts and Procedure Supervision
      • Check Conversion Detection
    • Questions
  • Chapter 3 - Billing Schemes - Part I: Billing Schemes Involving Shell Companies
    • Learning Objectives
    • Introduction
    • Shell Company Schemes
      • What Is a Shell Company?
      • Shell Company Bank Accounts
      • Suggestions for Identifying the Individual Who Owns a Suspected Vendor
    • How Payments Are Collected
      • Billing on Behalf of the Shell Company
      • Suggestions for Detecting Invoices from Shell Companies
    • Obtaining Payment on Fraudulent Invoices
      • Self-Approval of Fraudulent Invoices
      • Bogus Support Documentation
      • "Rubber-stamp" Supervisors
      • Suggestions for Detecting and Preventing False Billings when Controls over Purchase Approvals Break Down
      • Collusion
      • Suggestions for Detecting and Preventing Collusion Schemes
      • Pass-Through Schemes
      • Suggestions for Preventing or Detecting Pass-Through Schemes
  • Chapter 3 - Billing Schemes - Part II: Overbilling Schemes Involving Existing Vendors
    • Learning Objectives
    • Introduction
    • Kickback Schemes
      • Diverting Business to Vendors
      • Overbilling
      • Employees with Approval Authority
      • Fraudsters Lacking Approval Authority
      • Other Kickback Schemes
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Kickback Schemes
    • Pay-and-Return Schemes
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Pay-and-Return Schemes
    • False Invoicing from Non-Accomplice Vendors
    • Personal Purchases with Company Funds
      • Personal Purchases through False Invoicing
      • The Fraudster as Authorizer of Purchases
      • False Purchase Requisitions
      • Falsifying Purchase Orders
      • Personal Purchases on Credit Cards or Other Company Accounts
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting the Use of Company Credit Cards for Personal Purchases
      • Charge Accounts
      • Returning Merchandise for Cash
    • Preventing and Detecting Billing Schemes
      • Separation of Duties in the Purchasing Process
      • Red Flags S Billing Schemes
      • Control Objectives S Billing Schemes
      • Deterring Billing Schemes
    • Questions
  • Chapter 4 Payroll Schemes
    • Learning Objectives
    • Introduction
    • Ghost Employees
    • Placing a Ghost Employee on the Payroll
      • Authority to Add Employees
      • Ghosts with Familiar Names
      • Using Former Employees as Ghosts
      • Collecting Timekeeping Information
      • Approval of Timekeeping Information
      • Issuing the Ghost's Paycheck
    • Delivery of the Paycheck
      • Distribution to Fictitious Persons
      • Distribution to Accomplices
      • Distribution to Non-Accomplice Ghosts
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Ghost Employee Schemes
    • Falsified Hours and Salary
      • Manually Prepared Timecards
      • Forging a Supervisor's Signature
      • Collusion with a Supervisor
      • "Rubber-stamp" Supervisors
      • Poor Custody Procedures
      • Understating Leave and Vacation
      • Time Clocks and Other Automated Timekeeping Systems
      • Rates of Pay
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Falsified Hours and Salary Schemes
    • Commission Schemes
      • Fictitious Sales
      • Altered Sales
      • Altering the Rate of Commission
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Commission Schemes
    • Prevention and Detection of Payroll Schemes
      • Separation of Duties in the Payroll Process
      • Red Flags S Payroll Schemes
      • Independent Payroll Distribution
      • Analysis of Payee Address or Accounts
      • Overtime Authorization
      • Commissions
      • Analysis of Deductions from Payroll Checks
      • Prevention of Payroll Schemes
      • Periodic Review and Analysis of Payroll
    • Questions
  • Chapter 5 Expense Reimbursement Schemes
    • Learning Objectives
    • Introduction
    • Mischaracterized Expense Reimbursements
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Mischaracterized Expense Schemes
    • Overstated Expense Reimbursements
      • Altered Support
      • Over Purchasing
      • Overstating Another Employee's Expenses
      • Orders to Overstate Expenses
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Overstated Expense Reimbursements
    • Fictitious Expense Reimbursements
      • Producing Fictitious Receipts
      • Obtaining Blank Receipts from Vendors
      • Claiming Expenses Paid by Others
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Fictitious Expense Reimbursements Schemes
    • Multiple Reimbursements
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Multiple Reimbursement Schemes
    • Prevention and Detection of Expense Reimbursement Schemes
      • Reviewing Expense Reimbursement Requests
      • Review and Analysis of Expense Accounts
      • Red Flags S Expense Reimbursement Schemes
    • Questions
  • Chapter 6 Cash Theft Schemes - Part I: Check Tampering
    • Learning Objectives
    • Introduction
    • Forged Maker Schemes
    • Obtaining Blank Checks
      • Employees with Access to Company Checks
      • Employees without Access to Company Checks
      • Producing Counterfeit Checks
      • Suggestions for Detecting and Preventing the Theft of an Organization's Check Stock
    • To Whom Is the Check Made Payable?
      • To the Perpetrator
      • To an Accomplice
      • Payable to "Cash"
      • Payable to Vendors
    • Forging the Signature
      • Free-Hand Forgery
      • Photocopied Forgeries
      • Automatic Check-Signing Instruments
      • Suggestions for Detecting and Preventing Forged Signatures on Organization Checks
      • Tampering with the Signature Card
    • Forged Endorsement Schemes
    • Intercepting Checks before Delivery
      • Employees Involved in Delivery of Checks
      • Re-routing the Delivery of Checks
      • Theft of Returned Checks
      • Poor Control of Signed Checks
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting the Theft of Signed Company Checks by Employees
    • Altered Payee Schemes
      • Altering Checks Prepared by Others: Inserting a New Payee
      • Altering Checks Prepared by Others: "Tacking On"
      • Altering Checks Prepared by the Fraudster: Erasable Ink
      • Altering Checks Prepared by the Fraudster: Blank Checks
  • Chapter 6 Cash Theft Schemes - Part II: Check Tampering and Concealed Check Schemes
    • Learning Objectives
    • Introduction
    • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Schemes Whereby an Employee Alters the Payee and/or Amount on an Organization Check
    • Authorized Maker Schemes
      • Overriding Controls through Intimidation
      • Poor Controls
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Check Tampering by Authorized Check Signers
    • Concealing Check Tampering
      • The Fraudster Reconciling the Bank Statement
      • Re-Altering Fraudulent Checks
      • Falsifying the Disbursements Journal
      • Coding the Fraudulent Checks
      • Re-Issuing Intercepted Checks
      • Bogus Supporting Documents
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Check Tampering Schemes That Are Concealed by the Techniques Discussed Above
    • Preventing and Detecting Check Tampering Schemes
      • Separation of Duties
      • Red Flags S Check Tampering
      • Account Analysis through Cut-Off Statements
      • Bank Confirmation
      • General Control Objectives S Check Tampering
      • Bank-Assisted Controls
      • Physical Tampering Prevention
    • Questions
  • Chapter 7 Register Disbursement Schemes
    • Learning Objectives
    • Introduction
    • Common Register Disbursement Schemes
      • Failure to Require Approval on Register Disbursements
      • Rubber-stamp Managers
      • Forged Approval
      • Collusion with a Manager
      • Refunds and Voids below the Minimum Approval Amount
      • Credit Card Refunds
      • Destroying Records of the Transaction
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Fraudulent Refunds and Voids
    • Preventing and Detecting Register Schemes
      • Fictitious Refunds or Voided Sales
      • Red Flags S Register Disbursement Schemes
      • Prevention of Register Disbursement Schemes
    • Questions
  • Chapter 8 Fraud Involving Inventory, Supplies, and Fixed Assets
    • Learning Objectives
    • Introduction
    • Misuse of Fixed Assets
      • The Costs of Inventory Misuse
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Misuse of Fixed Assets
    • Theft of Inventory, Supplies, and Fixed Assets
      • Unconcealed Larceny
      • Larceny in Plain Sight
      • Larceny After Hours
      • Acquiescence of Co-workers
      • Larceny by Highly Trusted Employees
      • Mailing Stolen Assets off the Premises
      • Assistance from Outside Accomplices
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Unconcealed Larceny of Non-cash Assets
      • Fraudulent Requisitions and Transfers
      • Falsified Receiving Reports
      • Fraudulent Shipments of Merchandise
      • Suggestions for Preventing and Detecting Larceny of Non-cash Assets that Are Concealed by False Materials Requisitions, False Receiving Reports, and Fraudulent Shipments
    • Concealing Inventory Shrinkage
      • Altered Inventory Records
      • Fictitious Sales and Accounts Receivable
      • Write off Missing Non-cash Assets
      • Physical Padding
    • Preventing and Detecting Theft or Misuse of Inventory, Supplies, and Fixed Assets
      • Acquiring, Storing, and Shipping Inventory
      • Acquisitions and Storage
      • Shipping Inventory
      • Red Flags S Inventory Theft Schemes
      • Statistical Sampling
      • Perpetual Inventory Records
      • Shipping Documents
      • Physical Inventory Counts
      • Analytical Review
      • Computer-Generated Trend Analysis
      • Control Objectives S Inventory Schemes
      • Preventing Inventory Fraud
      • Proper Documentation
      • Independent Checks
      • Physical Safeguards
    • Questions
  • Chapter 9 Conclusion: Asset Misappropriation Case Study
    • Learning Objectives
    • Bob Daniel Case Study
    • Summing Up
  • Chapter 10 Practical Problems
    • Questions
  • Chapter 11 Ethics Focus: Consulting Services
    • Ethics Overview
    • Interpretation 101-3
    • Key Ethical Dilemmas
    • Addressing Ethical Dilemmas
    • Available Resources
  • Chapter 12 Latest Developments

Excerpts

Chapter 1 - The Pervasive Threat of Employee Theft

Learning Objectives

  • Develop an understanding of the depth, breadth, and trends of occupational fraud as a crime.
  • Develop awareness of the types of occupational fraud and abuse.
  • Understand the losses associated with occupational fraud and abuse, and asset misappropriation in particular.

Introduction

Occupational Fraud is defined as the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the organization's resources or assets.

In other words, occupational fraud and abuse occurs when an employee commits fraud against his/her employer. The threat of occupational fraud looms over every private business or public agency, regardless of its size, stature, or function. Research reveals that the frequency and costs of occupational fraud are staggering.

In 1983 Hollinger and Clark conducted a survey of more than 9,000 employees representing three industry segments. Approximately ⅓ of respondents admitted to stealing some form of company property during their tenure.1

In 1993 the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners surveyed over 2,500 Certified Fraud Examiners who had collectively investigated more than one million cases of criminal and civil fraud.

Respondents estimated that, within their own companies, fraud and abuse equaled approximately 6% of annual revenues. The authors reported the average organization loses more than nine dollars a day per employee to fraud and abuse.2

Occupational Fraud and Abuse

Ernst and Young's International Fraud Survey, conducted in 1998, involved 1,205 senior executives from major organizations in 32 countries. Researchers reported more than one half of the organizations had been victimized by fraud within the prior year. Thirty percent of those organizations had suffered more than five frauds in the prior five years.3 Eighty-four percent of the worst frauds in the survey were committed by employees.4

2006 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse

In 1996, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners released the first Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, the largest known privately funded study on the subject. The stated goals of that report were to

  • Summarize the opinions of experts on the percentage and amount of organizational revenue lost to all forms of occupational fraud and abuse.
  • Examine the characteristics of the employees who commit occupational fraud and abuse.
  • Determine what kinds of organizations are victims of occupational fraud and abuse.
  • Categorize the ways in which serious fraud and abuse occurs.

The ACFE released updated editions of the Report in 2002, 2004, and 2006. Like the first study, each subsequent edition was based on detailed case information about specific frauds provided by the CFEs who investigated those cases. The 2006 edition of the Report is based on 1,134 actual cases of occupational fraud.

Copies of the entire Report to the Nation can be downloaded or viewed at no charge on the ACFE's website, www.ACFE.com.

Measuring the Cost of Occupational Fraud

It should be clear to anyone who has spent time dealing with the subject of occupational fraud that attempts to accurately measure the frequency or cost associated with occupational fraud in the United States will be, at best, incomplete. Fraud, by its nature, is hidden, and so the true amount of fraud taking place in U.S. businesses at any one time cannot really be known.

Even attempts to measure the amount of fraud that has already been detected will lead to incomplete results. There is no central repository where fraud data is collected in the U.S. and a great deal of fraud cases go unreported, either because the victim organizations do not recognize that they have been defrauded, because they choose not to report the crimes for fear of bad publicity, or simply because they do not want to deal with the repercussions. Furthermore, even when fraud has been detected it may not be possible to determine exactly how much was stolen. Many frauds go undetected for years before they are caught, and organizations may find it unproductive or unsettling to trace through years of historical financial data to put a precise figure on the size of the crime.

Nevertheless, it is important to try to learn as much about occupational fraud as possible. This is a crime that affects, or has the potential to affect, every business in the United States - indeed, in


1 Richard Hollinger and John Clark, Theft by Employees (Lexington, MA: Lexington books, 1983), p. 42.
2 The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, The Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse (Austin, TX: ACFE, 1996), p. 14.
3 Ernst & Young International Fraud Group, Fraud: the Unmanaged Risk: An International Survey of the Effects of Fraud on Business (London, UK: Ernst & Young, 1998), p. 2.
4 Ernst & Young, p. 8.

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Videocourse Details

NASBA Field of Study: Accounting and Auditing
Level: Intermediate
Recommended CPE Credit: 17 (Accounting - 9, Auditing - 8)
DETECTING MISAPPROPRIATION SCHEMES TX08
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